As for these multiple new investigations, while perhaps necessary, there is no secret about what’s wrong. In 2010 Vice Admiral Phil Balisle was tasked to investigate the state of the surface force. The report clearly spelled out that training was poor, at every level; the material condition of ships was in decline; and the operational tempo for ships was crushing and prevented serious maintenance, even if funding existed (and it did not) to pay for repairs. If the “Balisle Report” had been acted on the Navy likely would not be where it is today.

Simply put, through no fault of their own, ships’ crews are stretched far too thin, and they are insufficiently trained, top to bottom. What has not been discussed, but which should be significantly more concerning, is the fact that if ships’ officers are not up to the fundamental task of safe navigation, how can they possibly be up to the task of complex warfighting?
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Individual-level training for both officers and enlisted personnel has been gutted. Testing and other performance-related standards were eliminated to improve throughput, reduce attrition, and make seniors happy.
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Just as Congress is not interested in fixing ships, neither is industry generally.
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Whose fault is this? It’s mine and every other surface officer because we failed to say “no” we will not take these ships to sea until they are fixed and their crews are trained.

People and Equipment: The Fitzgerald requested a rescue-and-assistance (R&A) team from the USS Dewey (DDG-105). The R&A team brought people, portable pumps, and hoses. Two key issues arise from this part of the incident: (1) the allocation of three portable and finicky self-powered pumps per ship may be inadequate; (2) DC is human-intensive; people are needed in numbers and for long periods. Sufficient manning for controlling battle damage is an essential element of the fleet’s combat viability. These points are worthy of deeper analysis as the Navy considers combat against capable naval opponents.

System Isolation: The report states that progressive flooding was, in part, the result of ruptured fire-main aqueous fire-fighting foam piping. What it does not address is the effectiveness of isolating those ruptures. Careful consideration is needed in looking at the ability of ships of all classes to effectively isolate ruptures as close as possible to the damage. While expense is involved, the cost of additional valves pales in comparison to the cost of a ship, a mission, or unnecessary loss of lives.

For example, there is an almost inexplicable overreliance on electronic aids, including automated radar systems and the automatic identification system (AIS) on the part of these new-school officers. Proven techniques, including the use of maneuvering boards, lookouts, adherence to the “Rules of the Road,” and, most important, watch-standers actually looking out the bridge window, are mysteriously archaic to officers who have become convinced that technology cannot fail them.

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