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Pełna wersja: Najlepiej wyszkoleni piloci
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biały Apacz2
Wcześniej nie było takiej debaty.Dalej uważam,że wyszkolenie to podstawa walki powietrznej, szczególnie tej podczas drugiej wojny światowej-gdzie przewaga technologiczna sprzętu nie miała tak decydującego znaczenia jak obecnie.Nie niestety nie pamiętam kto, powiedział,że tandemie maszyna człowiek, ważniejszą częścią był człowiek. Widać to dobrze na podstawie bitwy o Anglię,gdzie nie jednokrotnie piloci obsługujący Hurricane'y wygrywali pojedynki powietrzne z niemieckimi pilotami na doskonalszych technicznie Me 109. Jak również w Rosji w latach 43-45,gdzie mimo generalnie lepszych osiągów maszyn Radzieckich, to Niemieccy piloci byli skuteczniejsi w pojedynkach powietrznych.
Kryteria:
-umiejętności teoretyczne taktyki prowadzenia walki powietrznej
-umiejętności praktyczne w wykorzystaniu umiejętności teoretycznych
-doświadczenie w walkach powietrznych
-znajomość funkcjonowania i budowy maszyn powietrznych
-ilość godzin spędzonych w powietrzu przez pilota
.Ja głosowałem na Polaków,oczywiście,za to,że choć latali na różnych maszynach,zawsze dawali baty Niemcom

Halsey42
QUOTE(biały Apacz2 @ 25/01/2014, 10:29)
Widać to dobrze na podstawie bitwy o Anglię,gdzie nie jednokrotnie piloci obsługujący Hurricane'y wygrywali pojedynki powietrzne z niemieckimi pilotami na doskonalszych technicznie Me 109.
*


Może i niejednokrotnie, ale zwróćmy uwagę, że Bf 109 natrzaskały więcej Hurricane'ów i Spitfire'ów razem wziętych niż vice versa.

QUOTE(biały Apacz2 @ 25/01/2014, 10:29)
mimo generalnie lepszych osiągów maszyn Radzieckich
*


Co przez to rozumiesz?

QUOTE(biały Apacz2 @ 25/01/2014, 10:29)
Ja głosowałem na Polaków,oczywiście,za to,że choć latali na różnych maszynach,zawsze dawali baty Niemcom
*


Czy można prosić o uzasadnienie tego sądu w odniesieniu do września 1939 (plus źródło)?

I jeszcze taka ogólna uwaga, że przecież średni poziom wyszkolenia zmieniał się w czasie. Widać to szczególnie jaskrawo na przykładzie Niemców i Japończyków. Jak to ująć w ankiecie?
Julek150
QUOTE
Może i niejednokrotnie, ale zwróćmy uwagę, że Bf 109 natrzaskały więcej Hurricane'ów i Spitfire'ów razem wziętych niż vice versa.


Tylko że Bf109 walczyły praktycznie tylko przeciwko Spitfire i Hurricane i to one były głównym celem niemieckich pilotów. Natomiast Piloci alianccy oprócz z Bf-109 musieli tez zwalczać i Bf-110 jak i bombowce. Wiec lotnicy myśliwcy walczących stron byli w nieco innej sytuacji jak mieli inne priorytety.
biały Apacz2
QUOTE(Halsey42 @ 25/01/2014, 16:40)
QUOTE(biały Apacz2 @ 25/01/2014, 10:29)
Widać to dobrze na podstawie bitwy o Anglię,gdzie nie jednokrotnie piloci obsługujący Hurricane'y wygrywali pojedynki powietrzne z niemieckimi pilotami na doskonalszych technicznie Me 109.
*


Może i niejednokrotnie, ale zwróćmy uwagę, że Bf 109 natrzaskały więcej Hurricane'ów i Spitfire'ów razem wziętych niż vice versa.

QUOTE(biały Apacz2 @ 25/01/2014, 10:29)
mimo generalnie lepszych osiągów maszyn Radzieckich
*


Co przez to rozumiesz?

QUOTE(biały Apacz2 @ 25/01/2014, 10:29)
Ja głosowałem na Polaków,oczywiście,za to,że choć latali na różnych maszynach,zawsze dawali baty Niemcom
*


Czy można prosić o uzasadnienie tego sądu w odniesieniu do września 1939 (plus źródło)?

I jeszcze taka ogólna uwaga, że przecież średni poziom wyszkolenia zmieniał się w czasie. Widać to szczególnie jaskrawo na przykładzie Niemców i Japończyków. Jak to ująć w ankiecie?
*


1)Tylko,że głównie BF109 walczyły z Hurrcaine'ami to one głównie wzieły na siebie ciężar walk z Niemcami
2)Ła5M przewyższał uwczesne modele Me i
Focke
3)Podam, jak będę miał czas - znajdz ten czas. Moderator N_S
thrax
A co to takiego ten Ła-5M?
biały Apacz2
Miał być Ła-5FN
Halsey42
QUOTE(Julek150 @ 25/01/2014, 16:48)
QUOTE
Może i niejednokrotnie, ale zwróćmy uwagę, że Bf 109 natrzaskały więcej Hurricane'ów i Spitfire'ów razem wziętych niż vice versa.


Tylko że Bf109 walczyły praktycznie tylko przeciwko Spitfire i Hurricane i to one były głównym celem niemieckich pilotów. Natomiast Piloci alianccy oprócz z Bf-109 musieli tez zwalczać i Bf-110 jak i bombowce. Wiec lotnicy myśliwcy walczących stron byli w nieco innej sytuacji jak mieli inne priorytety.
*


Zgadza się - i dlatego stwierdzenie użytkownika @biały Apacz2 jest tym bardziej nieuprawnione.
Przyczyn zwycięstw Hurricane'ów nad Bf 109 nie należy bezpośrednio wiązać z poziomem wyszkolenia pilotów obu stron, a raczej z okolicznościami tych zwycięstw.

QUOTE(biały Apacz2 @ 25/01/2014, 18:37)
Tylko,że głównie BF109 walczyły z Hurrcaine'ami to one głównie wzieły na siebie ciężar walk z Niemcami
*


Proszę podać źródło.
Bo akurat Hurricane'y w miare możliwości starano się kierować przeciwko bombowcom, walkę z osłoną myśliwską pozostawiając Spitfire'om. Oczywiście nie dało się zawsze trzymać tej zasady - niemniej istniała.

QUOTE(biały Apacz2 @ 25/01/2014, 18:37)
Podam, jak będę miał czas
*


Czekam.

Oraz przypominam:
QUOTE(Halsey42 @ 25/01/2014, 16:40)
I jeszcze taka ogólna uwaga, że przecież średni poziom wyszkolenia zmieniał się w czasie. Widać to szczególnie jaskrawo na przykładzie Niemców i Japończyków. Jak to ująć w ankiecie?
*


To ważne.
Net_Skater
Jest taka strona pod nazwa The Army Air Forces in World War II www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/VI/AAF-VI-17.html na ktorej znajduje sie bardzo szczegolowy opis procedury treningu pilotazu w USA w czasie II WS. Wklejam to - ale tekst (i to bardzo dlugi) jest w j. angielskim wiec co zrobimy ?

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING OF FLYING PERSONNEL

Throughout the war a distinction was made between individual training, on the one hand, and crew and unit training on the other. The former prepared students in their individual specialties, such as pilot, navigator, or gunner; the latter taught those individuals to work effectively as a team. After July 1940 individual training of flying personnel was chiefly the function of the three Air Corps training centers, operating under the direction of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. In February 1942 this function was delegated to a single Flying Training Command, which, it will be recalled, in 1943 was merged with the Technical Training Command to form the Training Command, with headquarters at Fort Worth, Texas. Combat crew and unit training was conducted from early in 1941 by the four continental air forces; training of cargo and ferrying crews was carried on by the Air Transport Command.
Pre-Flying Training
As had been the case in the First World War, when ground schools for air cadets had been established at selected colleges throughout the country, it became necessary to provide for prospective pilots, bombardiers, and navigators extensive preflight instruction previous to their assignment to flying schools. During the interval between the two wars this had not been necessary. The small peacetime air establishment permitted the setting of high educational requirements for selection of cadets, and sufficient time was allowed for military indoctrination in the flying schools. The rapid expansion that began in 1939, however, presented special problems of military training for prospective officer--leaders of combat crews, and the early necessity of lowering educational standards for admission to cadet programs forced attention to means whereby a minimum level of academic preparation could be assured. The preflight school provided a solution to this two-sided problem.
In February 1941 the War Department authorized establishment of three Air Corps replacement training centers for classification and preflight instruction of candidates for pilot, bombardier, and navigator training. The official designation of "preflight school" was authorized on 30 April 1942, and the term replacement training center was dropped. By that time preflight schools were in operation at Maxwell Field, Alabama; Kelly and Ellington Fields, Texas; and Santa Ana Army Air Base, California. The school at Kelly Field was soon afterwards moved to an adjoining site, designated the San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center.
There was a difference of opinion as to whether pilot and nonpilot candidates should be assigned to the same preflight school. At first, all trainees were include............d in the same organization, but soon thereafter separate schools were provided. The general rule of separate, though similar, training was followed until April 1944. By that time the downward trend in the number of students called for consolidation, and the Training Command directed that pilot and bombardier-navigator schools be combined. Students thereafter entered preflight schools with only a general aircrew classification and were not assigned to a specialty until near the end of the preflight course. As the war moved to a climax, the unified school proved more adaptable to the shifting demands for each type of aircrew personnel. In November 1944, when the flow of students had been reduced to a trickle, all training was consolidated in one preflight school at the San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center.
Although agreement existed on the need for some kind of pre-flying training, ideas regarding the content of the course were vague when the schools first opened. In announcing the decision to undertake such instruction, OCAC stated that the preflight period would consist of "physical training, military training, supervised athletics and the complete processing of assigned students," as well as "additional instruction and training as may be practicable . . . to further qualify trainees for instruction as pilots, bombardiers, or navigators."
Training Center, leaned toward military discipline and physical conditioning as the primary aims of preflight, and his view was supported by many officers who viewed the academic program as sub-ordinate. Curricular development, however, followed the direction favored by those who stressed the need for technical knowledge on the part of aircrew members. There was a steady increase in the relative amount of time and recognition given to academic subjects, and this phase of the program became the paramount function of the preflight schools. Military training doubtless suffered from this trend, but the development was a logical response to the increasingly technical nature of air combat. Four weeks was the standard length of training at the replacement training centers until March 1942, when a nine-week course was instituted. Separate curricula were issued at that time for pilot and nonpilot training; the distinguishing feature of the latter curriculum was greater emphasis upon mathematics, target identification, photography, and meteorology. Until 1943 each preflight school exercised broad discretion in executing the prescribed program. The lack of uniform instruction proved a handicap in subsequent stages of aircrew training, and to correct this situation a single curriculum for all preflight students was published in April 1943. Final developments of the course were incorporated in a revision of May 1944, when the period of training was extended to ten weeks.
Under the various preflight curricula, students spent four to five hours daily in academic training. Many students entering preflight were so deficient in the fundamentals of mathematics and physics that considerable time had to be given to rudimentary drills, with emphasis upon problems related to performance of flying duties. Theory was reduced to a minimum, and matter inapplicable to aviation was progressively screened out of the courses. Since ability to use aeronautical maps and charts was basic to flying operations, an elementary course in that subject was also developed in the preflight schools. The course became increasingly practical as the necessary materials were made available for teaching purposes; a large portion of the allotted hours was reserved for student exercises in simulated operational problems which required use of aeronautical charts.
The subject of aircraft and naval vessel recognition slowly gained acceptance in recognition of its combat importance. Early teaching of planes and ships was largely ineffectual because too much was
attempted with too little time and equipment, but by 1943 the pre-flight recognition program was fairly satisfactory. The time allotted to the course was extended, and the number of visual aids greatly increased. During 1994 and 1945, with an adequate supply of projectors, slides, and screens, the schools were quite successful in training students to recognize, almost instantly, close-up views of the principal American and British aircraft. The scope of naval vessel recognition was gradually restricted to identification of ships by general type, including merchantmen and landing craft, rather than by nationality or individual class. Pilot trainees, in particular, were unhappy in having to take radio code instruction. It was admittedly a dull subject, requiring concentration and repetition. Student motivation was weakened by the fact that flyers returned from combat generally declared that overseas they had little use for code. Headquarters, AAF, however, repeatedly directed that code be taught, and all preflight students, except those who demonstrated proficiency, had to attend one hour of code daily. By 1944 both sending and receiving of code, by aural and visual means, were taught. The proficiency required was six words per minute.
Of the 175 hours of instruction called for in the official academic program of 1944, 110 were allotted to basic military and officer training. One-half of this time was set aside for close order drill, ceremonies, and inspections; the remainder went to classroom or squadron instruction in customs and courtesies of the service, chemical warfare defense, small-arms familiarization, and related military subjects. The West Point code of cadet discipline and honor was regarded as the model for the preflight schools. The traditional class system, with its more or less stereotyped forms of hazing, was introduced at first, but this practice came under severe public attack, and in spite of its defense by the responsible military authorities, the class system was abolished by order of the Flying Training Command in May 1943.9 While there may have been disciplinary advantages in the supervision of each lower class by upperclassmen, the hazing associated with the system interfered with the primary mission of the schools and was ill suited to the temperament of the civilian soldier. Physical conditioning was one of the major purposes of preflight, and after initial uncertainty regarding the nature of such training, a comprehensive and balanced program was evolved. Experimentation was the rule during the early period, when calisthenics, in varying amounts, were mixed with competitive sports, cross-country hikes, and obstacle courses. In September 1943 a weekly minimum of six hours of physical training was established for all aviation cadets. The trend toward uniform conditioning culminated in November 1949 when the Training Command published a detailed outline of exercises for each stage of aircrew training. This memorandum provided for a steady progression of physical hardening and a specified division of time among standard drills, team games, and aquatic exercises.
The chief problem in developing an effective preflight program was the lack of qualified academic instructors. Because few military personnel were available and they were inadequately prepared as teachers, it was realized that they could not be depended upon exclusively, and in July 1941 authority was granted to hire civilians. Within a year it was recognized that professional training and educational experience were prime requisites of academic instructors, and such men were procured in large numbers. Although these civilians were generally satisfactory, their status as civilians proved troublesome. They were authorized to wear military-type uniforms, but such quasi-military status did not make them feel at home in Army schools. Some of the men, furthermore, were in the process of being drafted by their selective service boards, and others were accepting commissions offered by the Navy. To hold on to these teachers, the AAF in the latter part of 1942 and during 1943 gave direct commissions to civilian instructors at the schools, as well as to several hundred procured directly from colleges, and sent them to the AAF administrative officer training school. Instructors under thirty-five were allowed to enlist and were then assigned to the officer candidate school. Practically all of the men who thus became officers were returned to their preflight teaching positions. In addition, a few instructors who were physically ineligible for commissions remained at the schools as enlisted men, and a small number of civilians were also retained.
Although most of the instructors were experienced college or high school teachers, some had almost no knowledge of some of the subjects they were assigned to teach. In order to deal with this problem, practical in-service training, consisting of classroom observations, individual study of textual materials, and conferences with veteran pre-flight teachers, was given at each school. Attention was limited at first to preparing each instructor in the subjects he was required to teach, but programs to improve teaching techniques and develop familiarization with the entire curriculum were later developed. In the summer of 1943 these local efforts were supplemented by a special course at the central instructors school at Randolph Field. After a considerable number of teachers had attended the six-week program there, the course for ground-school instructors was dropped in January 1944.
The typical aviation cadet was an eager learner in preflight school. Ground training in any form was viewed with some misgivings by the average cadet, but he responded willingly to preflight instruction. Pilot and navigator students usually showed the highest morale, because their classification most commonly coincided with their first preference. Many of the bombardier students, up to 1943, were eliminees from pilot training who, required to repeat preflight instruction, naturally resented the delay and repetition of subject matter. In 1943 bombardier morale was greatly improved when it was decided that an eliminee from one type of aircrew training, who had completed preflight, would no longer be required to retake that phase of training. As the war neared its end, the attitude of all students be-came less inspired. Delays in the progress of training, caused by curtailments in the aircrew program, proved especially disheartening.
The preflight schools formed an integral part of aircrew training throughout the war. In 1943 an additional phase of pre-flying instruction was introduced: the aircrew college training program, which lasted until July 199.4. The college program, to put it bluntly, came into existence not so much to meet an educational need as to hold a backlog of aircrew candidates. As has been previously noted,* the AAF had found it advisable in 1942 to recruit aviation cadets in excess of its immediate needs and to hold them in an inactive enlisted reserve until needed. By December 1942 approximately 93,000 men were awaiting classification and instruction, and many of them had been in this limbo for six or seven months. Not only did this extended in-active period discourage some of the men, but the pool of idle man-power received increasing notice from selective service boards and the War Manpower Commission. Accordingly, General Arnold proposed to the War Department that these men be called to active duty and given a period of college training designed to make up educational deficiencies.
In January 1943 the Secretary of War, after making certain modifications, ordered Arnold's recommendations into effect. The Services of Supply, then in the process of establishing the Army specialized training program in various colleges, was directed to set up aircrew college training as a separate project. The curriculum was planned to cover a five-month period, and all aircrew candidates were to be assigned from basic training centers to the colleges unless they could pass a special educational test. The relatively few who passed this test were sent directly to preflight schools.14 Special boards within the Flying Training Command made preliminary selection of colleges for the program, and the contracts for instruction, housing, messing, and medical care were later negotiated by the AAF Materiel Command. Implementation of the project suffered because of the haste in which it was conceived and executed; by April 1943 over 60,000 men were in aircrew college training detachments at more than 150 institutions.15 Since the AAF viewed the college enterprise primarily as a personnel rather than a training activity, it failed to establish a clear definition of its educational purpose. The educational objectives, as stated by the Flying Training Command, varied from a limited "Preparation both mentally and physically, for intensive ground training in the Preflight Schools" to the broader "attempt to diminish individual differences in educational background for subsequent air crew training."
Academic subjects, taught by college faculty members, include......d mathematics, physics, current history, geography, English, and civil air regulations. Military indoctrination, the responsibility of the officers of each detachment, consisted of drill, inspections and ceremonies, guard duty, customs and courtesies, and medical aid. Military training was carried into the academic phase by having the students march to and from classes and by insisting upon proper military courtesies at all times. Although there was a great variance in the degree of emphasis upon discipline at the colleges, this phase of the program was probably more valuable than any other, in that it at least helped adapt students to the standard regimen of Army training. Physical conditioning, required one hour daily, include......d calisthenics, running, and competitive sports.
Perhaps the most controversial phase of the curriculum was the ten hours of flight indoctrination. The AAF did not desire this instruction in the college program; it was prescribed by the War Department and conducted in cooperation with the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Flying schools located near the colleges provided the training under contract. Since the purpose of this flying was only familiarization, operations were restricted to simple maneuvers in light aircraft, under dual control by instructor and student. AAF observers criticized the training as of little value, charging that the students were "merely riding around for 10 hours." A study conducted in 1944 showed that the indoctrination course helped students materially in the regular primary stage of flying training but gave them no appreciable advantage in later stages. Whatever its long-range value, the course was a morale booster for men who had waited months to learn to fly.
As early as November 1943 moves were made toward liquidating the college program. By that time sufficient aircrew personnel were in the training pipeline, and the backlog of men on inactive status was relatively small. The Training Command took the view that the college program was not essential and that it was creating an unfavorable public attitude by holding combatage personnel in colleges while fathers were being drafted into military service. In January 1944 entrance of aircrew students into college was cut almost in half, and contracts with many institutions were terminated. In March, as a consequence of the general manpower shortage, the AAF was directed to return to the Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces all personnel recruited from those branches who had not reached the preflight stage of aircrew training. This order resulted in large withdrawals of students from the college detachments and sealed the fate of the program. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of War approved its final liquidation by July 1944; since procurement of aircrew candidates had been suspended, there appeared to be insufficient personnel in the backlog to sustain the program beyond that time. Although the number of enlisted reservists awaiting training had been greatly diminished by the middle of 1944, the general problem of backlogs, or personnel pools, was by no means ended. During the year requests from combat theaters for aircrew personnel declined sharply; entry of students into the flying stages of training was accordingly reduced, and this had created pools in intermediate stages of the training sequence. The Training Command concluded that the best solution to the problem was to distribute personnel from the pools to flying fields for on-the-job instruction. AAF Headquarters accepted the recommendation and authorized the beginning of on-the-line training, with a dual objective: to provide storage and training of delayed students and to alleviate the growing shortage of regularly assigned personnel at the airfields. On-the-line training was first put into effect in February 1944, and after termination of the college program in July, it became the principal holding device for pre-flying personnel pools.
Higher headquarters provided little guidance in the development of an instructional program for on-the-line students. The Training Command advised only that "trainees will be given duty assignments with aircraft maintenance and servicing where they will get more practical training for their future instruction." Responsibility for implementing the program was left almost entirely to individual station commanders, and this fact resulted in considerable variation in the training. Some commanders reasoned that the students would shortly be returned to the normal sequence of aircrew instruction and gave them slight attention; others saw the possibility of a longer period of delay and devoted a great deal of consideration to their training, work, and recreation.
Some stations offered a few elementary academic courses, but attendance was voluntary; a formal thirty-day mechanic course was established at stations of the Western Flying Training Command. At every field, however, student training consisted chiefly of apprentice experience in aircraft maintenance. Because of the increasing shortage of regularly assigned enlisted personnel, permission was eventually granted to use trainees for administrative and nontechnical duties, as well as on the flight line. Such permission tended to draw students ever closer to enlisted and further from cadet status. As progressive cuts in the aircrew program continued, large numbers of aircrew candidates were transferred to regular enlisted status and classified in their appropriate military occupational specialties. In no other stage of aircrew training was the problem of morale so serious as in on-the-line training. Lack of an explicit program was partially responsible, but delay and uncertainty concerning the students' future were of primary importance. Each step in curtailing the aircrew program was an added blow to morale. Although many of the trainees eventually reached flying schools, large numbers remained in the pools; by the end of 1944 some men had been in pre-aircrew status for almost a year. Higher headquarters showed concern over the attitude of such students and explained each curtailment of air-crew training quotas as the result of unexpected combat success. To young and ambitious men this explanation was hardly satisfying; as they moved toward enlisted status, many experienced bitter disappointment and sense of failure.
Pilot Training
Although the importance of other specialties was increasingly recognized during the war, the pilot remained the principal object of Air Corps training. While each member of the aircrew was essential to performance of assigned missions, the general success and safety of the crew depended mainly upon the pilot, who was the aircraft commander. Although the AAF made a substantially successful effort to give all flying personnel due recognition, it properly put flying training in top priority.
Development of a military pilot required a succession of training stages, for it was not feasible to train a man to fly a powerful combat or service airplane without preparation in simpler and less specialized aircraft. During the 1920's and 1930's pilots had received a total of twelve months' instruction, divided into three stages. After 1931 the primary and basic stages were given in an eight-month combined course at Randolph Field, Texas; a four-month advanced course, providing specialization in bombardment, pursuit, observation, or attack aviation, was taught at Kelly Field, Texas. This peacetime system of training was successful in producing a small number of graduates who were both skillful pilots and highly qualified junior officers.
In July 1939 the total instructional time was reduced from twelve to nine months. In the following May, with the war pressure mounting across the Atlantic, the period was cut to seven months. Although the introduction of preflight training in the following year compensated somewhat for the loss of time allotted to flying schools, the seven-month period, which allowed only ten weeks each for primary, basic, and advanced flying, was considered insufficient by existing standards. But national danger required unprecedented steps, and shortly after Pearl Harbor the time for each stage was forced down to nine weeks. In March 1944 each stage was lengthened to ten weeks, and after V-J Day to fifteen weeks. The post-hostilities schedule raised the time for individual pilot training to a level approximately that of the 1930's.
The three stages--primary, basic, and advanced--were common to the training of all Air Corps pilots, and upon graduation from advanced, students received their wings and bars. This step, however, did not signify the end of their training; the new pilots were given additional periods of specialized instruction suited to their military assignments. Such instruction include............d in all cases a period of transition flying.
The term "transition" was applied generally to a pilot's learning to operate an unfamiliar plane; thus all students underwent several brief transition phases as they progressed through the normal stages of pilot training. In primary they learned to fly a small aircraft of low horsepower; in basic they transitioned to a heavier plane with more complex controls; in advanced they learned to fly a still more powerful machine which approximated the characteristics of combat aircraft. Transition to combat planes, which generally did not occur until after a pilot had earned his wings, was a larger undertaking than previous transitions to training planes. It involved not only learning to fly a complex, high-performance aircraft, but also the acquisition of flying techniques, preliminary to operational unit training. In order to make adequate provision for this step, a special stage, called transition, was evolved in the major pilot programs.
When the Air Corps' expansion began in 1939, transition to combat aircraft was a function of the GHQ Air Force and units in overseas departments; the four continental air forces took over this job and carried it on until 1942. By that time the program had become too large for the air forces alone to direct in addition to their operational unit training. Consequently, transition of pilots to heavy and medium bombardment aircraft was assigned to the Flying Training Command, the agency primarily responsible for individual flying instruction. Light bombardment and fighter transition, however, remained a function of the continental air forces' operational units.
The time allotted to pilot transition to combat planes varied throughout the war, but by May 1944 it was stabilized at ten weeks for bombardment transition. Fighter pilots received five weeks of transition on obsolescent combat types before being assigned to operational units, where they were given transition on current fighter types prior to tactical training. Transition to the specific aircraft to be flown in combat was the last stage of a pilot's individual training. Upon completion of this stage, he was ready to start training as a member of an aircrew and a combat unit. Crew and unit indoctrination normally required about twelve weeks, after which the aerial teams were sent to staging areas to prepare for movement overseas. Even though the time for primary-basic-advanced training of pilots was reduced during the war to seven months or less, a pilot was not ready for combat until a year or more after he started flying instruction.
Until July 1939 primary training, as well as other phases of pilot training, had been conducted exclusively at Air Corps stations by military instructors. Thereafter, as described above,* the Air Corps depended increasingly upon civilian schools working under contract to provide primary instruction to air cadets; by May 1943 there were fifty-six contract primary schools in operation. At each school the AAF maintained a small military contingent whose services were gradually expanded, but the military element in the activity of these schools was subordinated to the task of learning to fly. The termination of contracts began with the curtailment of pilot training in 1944, and by the end of the war the responsibility for primary training had been returned to regular AAF establishments. The instruction given at the contract schools was an adaptation of the primary phase formerly taught at Randolph Field. Although the number of weeks allotted to primary training was sharply reduced, the number of flying hours remained almost constant after the original requirement of sixty-five hours had been trimmed to sixty in March 1942. In that year an unsuccessful attempt was made to add instrument, night, and navigation instruction to the curriculum, but otherwise the program remained virtually the same during the war. As given at the height of the effort, primary flying training was divided into four standard phases. In the pre-solo phase students became familiar with the general operation of a light aircraft and achieved proficiency in forced landing techniques and in recovering from stalls and spins. In the second, or intermediate phase, pre-solo work was reviewed, and precision of control was developed by flying standard courses or patterns, known as elementary 8's, lazy 8's, pylon 8's, and chandelles. The third, or accuracy, phase demanded high proficiency in various types of landing approaches and landings; the fourth, or acrobatic, phase required ability to perform loops, Immelmann turns, slow rolls, half-rolls, and snap rolls. The ratio of dual to solo hours was flexible within the limitation that a minimum of 40 per cent and a maximum of 50 per cent of the total time was to be dual. Each student in primary was required to make at least 175 landings. It was the mission of the basic schools to make military pilots out of primary graduates; hence, these schools were completely controlled and operated by the military. Although basic flying was conducted by a few private contractors, on a trial basis, from 1941 to 1943 and the experiment met with some success, AAF officials questioned the ability of civilians to teach military flying techniques, and by the end of 1943 curtailment of the pilot program removed any necessity for using private agencies in basic training. The student at basic learned to operate a plane of greater weight, power, and complexity than the plane which he had mastered in primary. In addition, the student was introduced to new aspects of airmanship, learning to fly by instruments, at night, in formation, and cross-country. The military instructors emphasized precision and smoothness of airplane operation, and a large portion of flying time was devoted to repetition of maneuvers to develop proficiency. After 1939 the basic stage was accomplished in from 70 to 75 hours of flying, as compared with the loo hours required before that time. It was divided into a transition phase, involving familiarization with the plane and fundamental operations, and a diversified phase, which include......d accuracy maneuvers and acrobatics, and formation, instrument, navigation, and night flying. Reduction in training time was at first effected by eliminating navigation and formation flights and decreasing slightly the hours allotted to other portions of the diversified phase. In 1940 formation and day navigation flights were restored to the curriculum, and Link trainer instruction was added. Soon after Pearl Harbor, in response to observed combat requirements, increasing emphasis was placed upon the diversified phase, but the change was unsatisfactory, because it allowed too little time for fundamental transition exercises. The root of the difficulty lay in the fact that the nine weeks given to basic from 1942 to 1944 were not enough to permit satisfactory development of proficiency in both phases of training. Since it was impracticable to accomplish the full objective, there was a serious controversy over which phase should receive principal emphasis. During 1943 the curriculum was modified to favor transition at the expense of diversified training and, as might have been expected, graduates showed greater proficiency in the so-called flying fundamentals but were weak in formation and instrument flying. Criticisms of this weakness from combat units brought a change in basic curricular requirements in May 1944, at which time the length of training was extended to ten weeks. Although the hours allotted to flying were held constant, there was a shift of hours within the diversified phase, instrument time being increased at the expense of acrobatics.
Instrument training was doubtless the most important part of the basic curriculum. Experience in combat underlined the necessity of flying at night and under all weather conditions, and such missions required operation of aircraft by instruments. The nature and extent of the instrument indoctrination given to pilots at basic schools were insufficient until late in 1943, partly because of the traditional peace-time attitude of training officers who subordinated instrument work to conventional visual maneuvers. Another reason for this deficiency was the acute shortage of instructional time and equipment; more-over, the system of instrument flying used by the AAF before June 1943 was not the most efficient. The AAF system relied almost exclusively upon the three rate instruments: the needle, or rate-of-turn indicator; the ball, or bank indicator; and the airspeed indicator. Gyroscopic instruments were practically ignored. During 1942 the Navy developed an improved method of instrument flying, the full-panel system, which relied chiefly upon the directional gyroscope and the artificial horizon. AAF instructors who observed the new method found it to be more accurate than the traditional one; hence, the full-panel system was introduced at basic and advanced pilot schools in June 1943. Assistance in establishing the new system was given by officers from the central instructors school (instrument pilot), which had been activated in March 1943 as a means of strengthening the AAF instrument program. During the succeeding year a substantial improvement in the instrument proficiency of basic graduates was achieved; this resulted from standardized employment of the more efficient system, proper training of instructors, procurement of adequate equipment, and allocation of more flying hours to instrument work.
The traditional basic curriculum had always been confined to training on single-engine aircraft; differentiation of students for single-engine or two-engine instruction did not normally occur until advanced training. But during 1943 and 1944 an attempt was made, in the interest of improving the proficiency of multiengine pilots, to begin two-engine training for them in basic. Although the majority of students continued to receive the standard single-engine curriculum, small numbers were entered into one of two experimental curricula. The first of these was a combination course; after transitioning on the single-engine basic trainer, the student received familiarization instruction on a two-engine plane. The second course was conducted exclusively with two-engine aircraft. Although the experimental curricula showed some promise, they were abandoned in 1945 The combination course allowed too little time for the student to gain more than familiarization with either type of plane; the second course proved impracticable because of the shortage of appropriate two-engine aircraft. The experiment indicated, however, that if adequate numbers of satisfactory trainers were planned for and provided, differentiation of instruction at the basic stage would prove more efficient than the conventional curriculum. Although twin-engine training did not become a permanent part of the basic curriculum, one of the responsibilities of the basic schools was the selection of students for single- or two-engine advanced training. Assignment was based upon a combination of factors--current requirements for fighter and multiengine pilots, the student's aptitude, his physical measurements, and preference. After the middle of 1944, however, student choice was generally disregarded. Preferences for fighter training exceeded the demand, and there were not enough men with the requisite physical qualifications who desired bombardment. Some schools found it necessary to assign all men with the required physique to advanced two-engine schools.
The differentiation of single-engine from two-engine training in the advanced stage was not effected until the spring of 1942 although planning for the change dated back to October 1940.34 As it had evolved by 1944, the single-engine curriculum consisted of seventy hours of flying instruction, compared with seventy-five hours in 1939. It include......d five phases--transition, instrument, navigation, formation, and acrobatics; Link trainer time was also required. Instrument operation was a continuation of the methods learned in basic; the transition, navigation, and formation phases all required night flights. In response to the lessons of war, increasing emphasis was placed on formation flying, especially at high altitudes and using the close, three-plane V-formation. Acrobatics include......d all conventional combat maneuvers within the performance limits of the advanced trainer. Although some of the graduates of the advanced single-engine school eventually were assigned as noncombat pilots or were sent to bombardment operational training units for service as co-pilots, the principal mission of the school was to prepare students for subsequent flying in fighter aircraft. To achieve this end, the advanced schools stressed the handling of maneuverable, speedy training planes and the development of instantaneous control reactions in students.
But besides expert flying ability, the fighter pilot needed skill in fixed aerial gunnery. Hence, during the course of advanced training the more promising students, those who were to become combat fighter pilots, were assigned to a fighter-transition and gunnery stage. This preparation for operational unit training consisted of some twenty hours of fixed gunnery practice in the standard advanced training plane and about ten hours of transition in an obsolescent combat type (P-40 or P-39). Development of proper techniques and equipment for fixed gunnery training came slowly, although gradual improvement was noted after 1942 when better teaching methods and use of synthetic trainers and the gunsight-aiming-point camera had been instituted. In 1944, as the pressure for numbers of graduates eased, the gunnery and fighter-transition phase were made into a separate course to be taken after graduation from advanced. This change lengthened by five weeks the over-all period for training fighter pilots.
Although advanced two-engine training did not begin until the spring of 1942, it expanded rapidly thereafter in response to the growing demand for multiengine pilots. All students, except a few chosen to become night or two-engine fighter pilots, were marked for assignment to bombardment-type aircraft. The number of hours and types of flying instruction were the same as in the advanced single-engine course. The principal difference in the two-engine course was the absence of training in acrobatics and the greater emphasis on instrument work; all flying was conducted in two-engine planes. Upon graduation from advanced two-engine schools, pilots were assigned to transition training on specific combat types. Beginning in 1942, transition for medium and heavy bombardment was conducted by stations of the Flying Training Command; the Third Air Force continued to provide transition for light bombardment as a part of operational unit training. Separate schools were established for each type of airplane; the first of these, for B-17 transition, opened in March 1942. Initial attempts to conduct full combat-crew training at these schools were abandoned in August 1942, and instruction thereafter was confined to transition of first pilots only. An independent program for co-pilot transition was carried on at selected gunnery and technical schools of the Training Command from 1944 to April 1945.
Until the fall of 1942 entrance into bombardment transition was restricted to pilots with at least one year's flying experience. When it became necessary to train recent graduates of advanced schools, the instructional period had to be doubled in length; by May 1944 it amounted to ten weeks. Although some differentiation for each type of aircraft was found to be desirable, the flying curricula, each of which prescribed about 100 hours of flying, were generally similar. Instrument, navigation, and high-altitude training received increasing attention in the four-engine schools; formation flying was emphasized in two-engine transition. Toward the end of the war, closer liaison was developed with the combat air forces in order to adapt instruction to the changing requirements of the air war.
Ground training, from primary through transition, was an essential aspect of the instruction received by AAF pilots, instruction designed to prepare the student for successful performance of flight duties. Although air and ground indoctrination were inadequately coordinated at first, a satisfactory integration was achieved by 1944 through more careful planning of the curriculum and frequent conferences between the teaching staffs of the air and ground departments. Mutual understanding was advanced by encouraging familiarization flights for ground instructors and classroom observations by flying instructors.
When the accelerated training program was begun in 1939, the ground curricula at the various stages of instruction consisted of a large number of short courses. For several years thereafter, directives from the higher commands remained vague as to requirements, and each school consequently had a more or less individual curriculum. Continuity of subject matter from one stage to the next was lacking, and considerable duplication between stages prevailed. Gradually, a more orderly sequence of ground training was developed,41 and by May 1944 the program had become relatively well stabilized at each stage of individual training. Five major courses, calling for a total of ninety-six hours, were given at the primary schools. Almost half of this time was devoted to the aero-equipment course, which was devoted to the principles and workings of the various operating systems of an aircraft. Navigation, the next most extensive course, was a continuation of the maps and charts course taught in the preflight schools and emphasized planning for cross-country flights. A course in principles of flight consisted of elementary applied physics, with special reference to airplane structures and flight behavior. Continuation training in aircraft and naval recognition, as well as in radio code, was also provided. In all courses theory was held to a minimum, emphasis being upon teaching the student how to perform necessary operations.
Pilot trainees received their first instruction in weather during the basic stage. They were also then introduced to the principles of instrument flight, because it was in the basic schools that students learned to fly at night and under all weather conditions. Radio communication procedures were taught at this stage, and the sequence of training in aircraft and naval recognition aimed at achieving proficiency in identifying relatively distant views of the principal planes and vessels.
Ground school at the advanced stage was similar for both single-engine and two-engine trainees. It include..d the same amount of instruction in weather, taking up the subject where it was left at the end of the basic stage. Further ground training on flight instruments was also given to both types of students, as well as a course in flight planning. The chief difference in the two curricula was in the aeroequipment course, which, since the two-engine was more complex than the single-engine trainer, was given more time at the two-engine schools. Single-engine students, on the other hand, received training in armament and fixed gunnery, which was not required for two-engine pilots.
Technical instruction did not end when students received their wings and were assigned to transition on specific combat airplanes. Both fighter and bomber pilots, while undergoing transition to their combat planes, received appropriate ground instruction in equipment and practical maintenance. Intensive training in armament and fixed gunnery was given only to fighter pilots; the multiengine pilots received special instruction in weather, radio equipment, aircraft weight and balance, bombing-approach procedures, and duties of the airplane commander.
Although graduates of its pilot schools were officers as well as flyers, in the wartime pressure to produce pilots rapidly the AAF paid but scant attention to their military training. The atmosphere of the civilian-operated primary schools was not conducive to the development of rigid discipline, and too little time was available for military instruction at all the stages of pilot training. What instruction there was, over and above the regimen of Army life, was restricted largely to marching, ceremonies, inspections, and military customs and courtesies. The vigorous physical conditioning which began in preflight schools was, however, continued and intensified during flying training.
The method of teaching men to fly military aircraft remained fundamentally the same from 1939 through 1945. The sequence was this: explanation by the instructor of each new maneuver, actual demonstration by the instructor, supervised student performance, correction of student errors, and then practice. Progress checks by supervisors were made at specified intervals; final checks, toward the end of each stage of training, tested the ability of the student to operate the airplane under all required conditions. The student, so far as practicable, was taught by the same instructor through all the lessons of a particular training stage. Departure from this "all-through" system was tried experimentally during 1943 as a possible means of accelerating training. Under the new plan, the flying curriculum at a given training stage was divided into a series of phases, with instructors assigned each to a particular phase. The student could advance individually through the progressive phases as rapidly as his proficiency would permit, and he had a different teacher for every phase. The advantage of the plan was that it permitted the instructor to concentrate on teaching a limited number of maneuvers, with a resultant increase in his teaching skill. The principal disadvantage came from the fact that frequent change of instructors made it difficult for both students and teachers to develop the mutual understanding which facilitates learning. It was finally decided to abandon the experiment, chiefly because it caused serious scheduling difficulties and required a higher ratio of instructors and airplanes to students than the standard "all-through" plan.
Ground-school instruction depended primarily upon classroom lectures, demonstrations, and discussions. Some courses, such as radio code and aircraft recognition, consisted mainly of aural or visual drill. Training aids were used as available, but during the early period of the war these were limited almost entirely to what could be produced locally. After 1943 the situation was considerably improved, and the Training Command produced and distributed manuals and handbooks for both instructors and students. Special emphasis was placed upon mock-ups of operational equipment, and standard sets of such aids were prepared. During 1944 and 1945 increasing numbers of effective training films, slides, and charts were also made available.45 The most important synthetic device used in instruction of pilots was the Link trainer--a machine in which students could simulate blind flying by means of instruments; it was regulation equipment at every school where instrument flying was taught.
Indoctrination of new teachers, as well as in-service training for experienced teachers, proved to be a continuing necessity in the pilot-instruction program. In the early period the individual schools provided training of a sort for instructors, but by the close of 1942 each subcommand of the Flying Training Command had established a single instructor school for personnel within its jurisdiction. It will be recalled that, in the interest of standardizing training methods and content throughout the command, these regional schools were supplanted in 1943 by one central school at Randolph Field, where various instructor programs aimed to establish and demonstrate stand and instruction for the various phases of student training. Courses corresponding to each of the regular stages of pilot training were given to flying instructors; they consisted of both classroom and air indoctrination. Special courses for ground-school instructors and military training officers were also conducted. Some attention was given also to general teaching methods, psychology of learning, and analysis of flying maneuvers, but these courses were not very effective. The major weakness of the central instructors school appeared to be its inability to secure and retain the best qualified personnel as staff instructors. Soon after the Randolph Field courses were started, a second central school for the exclusive training of instrument-flying instructors was established at Bryan, Texas. In addition to these two central schools, supplementary instructor-training programs were conducted at the individual pilot schools until the end of the war.
The principal item of equipment in pilot training was, of course, the airplane itself. Almost all of the schools were hard pressed by the shortage of trainers until after 1943, and it was necessary to use some models which were hardly satisfactory but, being the only ones available, had to be used. Full conversion to the most appropriate models was not accomplished until the spring of 1945.48 Among primary training planes, the Stearman PT-13 was eventually selected to replace all other primary trainers. A biplane, and thus different from later trainers and combat types, the PT-13 had the special virtue of ruggedness, a quality not to be despised in a plane that had to take the punishment inflicted by a novice. During most of the war period, the Vultee BT-13, a low-wing monoplane of medium horsepower, served as the standard trainer for basic flying. Regarded by many as altogether too easy to fly, it was being replaced during the latter part of the war by the AT-6, a low-wing monoplane already in use as the standard trainer for advanced single-engine instruction. No suitable training plane became available for advanced two-engine flying until late in the war, when the B-25 was modified for the purpose. Theretofore, the Cessna AT-17 and UC-78, the Beech AT-10, and the Curtiss AT-9 were used, with the last considered the most satisfactory.51 In the transition stage, combat models, which could not always be the latest, were usually stripped down and flown without full fighting equipment.
A total of 193,440 pilots was graduated from AAF advanced flying schools between 1 July 1939 and 31 August 1945. The number under instruction increased very rapidly from 1939 until 1943; the
peak was reached in December 1943 when over 74,000 students were in the various stages of individual pilot training. By contrast, the total number remaining in August of 1945 was only about 5,000.
Successful completion of pilot training was not easy. During the period from 1939 until V-J Day more than 124,000 students failed to complete the primary, basic, or advanced stage of pilot instruction. This figure, which include......d fatalities, amounted to almost 40 per cent of the number that entered the flying course. The proportion of students eliminated, as would be expected, was highest in primary training and lowest in advanced. No fixed elimination rate was ever imposed from above; a variety of factors determined the number of failures in a given class at a given school. One determinant, of course, was individual differences in the aptitude and motivation of students; another was the varying quality of instructors and training facilities. One of the most important causes for variation in the elimination rate was the fact that judgment of flying proficiency had to be subjective. Teachers and supervisors established differing criteria of proficiency, and no truly objective form of measurement was developed during the war period. But the aptitude of the students and the quality of instruction did not alone cause the elimination rate to fluctuate--the training establishment was also sensitive to the attitudes of higher authority. The Army Air Forces desired pilots of the highest skill consistent with the demand for numbers and the supply of eligible young men. Whenever substantial backlogs of trainees accumulated and the personnel requirements of combat units appeared to be stabilized, higher headquarters stressed rigid maintenance of proficiency standards. When, as a result of this policy, the over-all pilot elimination rate rose to a point considered excessive, higher headquarters impressed upon all training establishments the necessity of reducing manpower wastage. This policy constituted a realistic, if crude, means of compromising the conflicting needs for quality and numbers of pilots. The students eliminated from pilot training were not lost to the AAF, since most of them were reassigned to other types of instruction or service. The majority of those who had the qualifications were sent to bombardier or navigator schools. If not so qualified, they were assigned to other combat-crew positions, which normally required courses in flexible gunnery and one of the various companion specialties, such as airplane mechanics.
Halsey42
Ja z kolei chciałbym polecić opis treningu pilota USN, zawarty w książce Johna Lundstroma The First Team. Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway.
biały Apacz2
Dobra,ale nie zaprzeczysz,że większość Polaków latała na Hurricanach w czasie Bitw o Anglię i na nich odnosiła swe zwycięstwa,co przy założeniu,że Polacy byli najlepszymi Pilotami czyni, ten duet najlepszym zestawieniem, przynajmniej jeśli mówimy o strąceniach przypadających na poszczególne dywizjony.
Halsey42
QUOTE(biały Apacz2 @ 26/01/2014, 19:18)
Dobra,ale nie zaprzeczysz,że większość Polaków latała na Hurricanach w czasie Bitw o Anglię i na nich odnosiła swe zwycięstwa,co przy założeniu,że Polacy byli najlepszymi Pilotami czyni, ten duet najlepszym zestawieniem, przynajmniej jeśli mówimy o strąceniach przypadających na poszczególne dywizjony.
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Zwycięstwa Polaków podczas BoB są dalece przesadzone czy wręcz zmitologizowane, co znakomicie widać na przykładzie Dywizjonu 303. Polecam Jacek Kutzner, 303.Dywizjon Myśliwski w bitwie o Wielką Brytanię.
Julek150
Wszystkie zwycięstwa w BoB są przesadzone i Polacy nie byli jakimiś wyjątkami. W zaokrągleniu piloci RAF zawyżyli dwukrotnie a Luftwaffe Trzykrotnie. A w 100% to tego się nigdy zweryfikować nie da.
Artimax
QUOTE
Dobra,ale nie zaprzeczysz,że większość Polaków latała na Hurricanach w czasie Bitw o Anglię i na nich odnosiła swe zwycięstwa,co przy założeniu,że Polacy byli najlepszymi Pilotami czyni, ten duet najlepszym zestawieniem, przynajmniej jeśli mówimy o strąceniach przypadających na poszczególne dywizjony.


Również dywizjony 242 401 i 402 latały na Hurricanach. Pytanie do użytkownika biały Apacz2 - jaka to nacja tam latała? Tylko bez googlowania... Mozna się nieźle zdziwić... Ja trochę z przekory oddałem na nich swój głos.

Net_Skater
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_World..._II_flying_aces

Ta strona angielskiej Wiki zawiera liste pilotow II WS z najwieksza liczba zestrzelen.


N_S
Halsey42
QUOTE(Julek150 @ 26/01/2014, 23:21)
Wszystkie zwycięstwa w BoB są przesadzone i Polacy nie byli jakimiś wyjątkami. W zaokrągleniu piloci RAF zawyżyli dwukrotnie a Luftwaffe Trzykrotnie. A w 100% to tego się nigdy zweryfikować nie da.
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Zapytam tak: ile dywizjonów było w 11. Grupie Myśliwskiej, do której należał Dywizjon 303, a jaki jest stosunek jego "oficjalnych" zwycięstw do zwycięstw tej grupy we wrześniu-październiku 1940?
biały Apacz2
Może Kanadyjczycy,Amerykanie..
Halsey42
QUOTE(biały Apacz2 @ 27/01/2014, 9:07)
Kanadyjczycy
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Jak to uzasadniasz?
biały Apacz2
Nie mam nic konkretnego- jak zazwyczaj. Wiem tylko,że i jedni i drudzy walczyli w BoB
Halsey42
QUOTE(biały Apacz2 @ 27/01/2014, 14:51)
Nie mam nic konkretnego- jak zazwyczaj. Wiem tylko,że i jedni i drudzy walczyli w BoB
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